Alberta Beef Producers October 26, 2004
Marvin Conrad, Chairman
Technical Committee
320, 6715 – 8th Street NE
Calgary, Alberta
T2H 7H7
RE: AARI Report “Needs and Gaps Relevant to BSE” & the “Harvard BSE Risk Analysis”
Dear Mr. Conrad,
With the issuance of the ABP Annual Report 2004, it has come to my attention that false and misleading information is continuing to push its way into analytical reports regarding BSE. The problem starts with the following statement quoted from the AARI report, within your technical committee’s report;
“While other hypothesis on the origin of BSE point to copper deficiency or exposure to organophosphates, the Harvard Centre for Risk Analysis points out that epidemiological data does not support these hypothesis.”
Upon examination of the source of this statement within the Harvard analysis document, no specific epidemiological data can be found, instead there is a reliance solely upon the Gabriel Horne Report 2001 commissioned by the U.K. government. This report stated:
“Nearly all cows which developed BSE were born after 1982 so were never treated with Phosmet to eradicate warble fly.”
This statement is false, and originates from lies tabled within the Horne report regarding the timing of the UK Warble Eradication Program. In fact, the warble eradication program STARTED in 1982. (Warble Fly Order 1982).
Cattle producers in the UK were given the option of using Phosmet or Ivermectin, for control of warbles. In some counties the Order was compulsory, while others were not. The use of Ivermectin required a 28 day withdrawal period (for milk and meat), while the use of Phosmet had a withdrawal period of only 6 hours. This fact, forced dairy farmers to use the Phosmet or lose a months worth of income from their milk sales. The beef producers, mostly, chose to use the Ivermectin.
One of the proponents of the organophosphate (OP) connection is Mark Purdey. I am sure you are aware of his work. Mark took the British Government to court and challenged the 1982 Order by way of a judicial review. This was in 1984. The government had planned on treating his cattle with the OP compound and recovering their expenses from Mark. The judicial review sided in favor of Mr. Purdey; and he was exempted from treating his dairy cows with Phosmet. Restrictions were placed on the movement of his cattle; and, he agreed to treat his heifers with Ivermectin.
ABP Technical Committee/Czar letter… Page 2
This data clearly shows that the Horne report statement, followed by both the Harvard BSE Risk Assessment and the Alberta Agricultural Research Institute “Perspective” are false and inaccurate. When the British Government was told that they would be sued for the misleading and false information published in the Horne Report (a lawsuit threatened by Mr. Purdey), Mr. Purdey was told that he could not sue anyone who was acting on behalf of the Government. The Horne report remained as it was, and no attempt has been made to correct these lies.
In an attempt to then crush the OP connection, Harvard restates that OPs had been in use since 1960 and that the epidemiology did not suggest any connection, as, “nearly all cows which developed BSE were born after 1982…”. This statement is a half truth. The committees in Britain, USA, and Canada have failed to address; (1) the substantially lower chemical concentrations of Phosmet used in the years preceding 1982, (2) whether the product was used as a systemic (oil-based), or surface contact (water-based), (3) increased frequency of application (bi-annual), (4) government campaign recommending 14-day follow-up reapplication after 1982, etc. etc. etc.
Papers released from the BSE Inquiry show that the toxic chemical concentration of Phosmet in the ‘60s and ‘70s was 5% (1972). In December of 1978, a concentration of 20% was first approved. All of these reports, quoted by your committee, fail to acknowledge existing epidemiological data correlating high BSE prevalence in countries specifically using this high concentration in their own warble eradication programs.
Another statement, within the Horne report, made to crush the OP connection was:
“Guernsey, which had no official campaign against warble fly had 669 cases of BSE. Jersey which did officially treat cattle for warbles had only 138 cases”.
The Horne committee did not take into account that cattle producers, although not ordered to use the product, not only did so at their own choosing, but, were strongly encouraged to use the product through government promotional campaigns. Therefore, in actuality, the fact that an official government mandated program existed, or did not exist, has no relationship as to actual chemical usage. To date, the UK Government and chemical manufacturing companies refuse to provide historical chemical distribution data to validate their claims.
Further, based on OIE data, the number of cases reported in Guernsey, as of June 30/04, is 700, of these only 100 were actually tested for BSE. The remaining 600 were diagnosed on clinical grounds only. Considering that the clinical symptoms of BSE, OP poisoning and other neurological diseases are similar in cattle, hundreds of the suspect Guernsey animals may not have had BSE at all. Only if the animals on both islands had been tested in an identical manner for BSE, could we compare them epidemiologically. Any existing comparison of these statistics is unscientific and misleading.
ABP Technical Committee/Czar letter… Page 3
There are many other factors which can explain this scenario; however, the investigating committees have refused to follow them up. An acquaintance of ours, formerly from the UK, has stated “that the health of their dairy herd required copper sulfate be added on a daily basis to its’ drinking water, or else the cattle started to stagger and hump-up”. There was no investigation to determine who may have been treating their cattle in this, or any other manner, which might have prevented these clinical symptoms.
At this time, I would strongly suggest that you read a document submitted by Mark Purdey to the British Government outlining his rebuttal of statements made in the Gabriel Horne report, entitled, “The Prof. Gabriel Horne report on the origins of BSE and the research of Mark
Purdey.” This can be found at www.purdeyenvironment.com/Horne.htm There are many other false and misleading statements from the Horne report which Mr. Purdey addresses.
Upon further inquiry, I have also found many important documents from Mr. Purdey that warrant your time and full attention. These are:
BSE Inquiry/Statement No. 23 Evidence given on 02/04/98 – statement by Mark Purdey ,
See www.purdeyenvironment.com/bseinqui.htm
Also of great value is his rebuttal statements made to correct misinformation from others who testified at the BSE Inquiry. This is called Mark Purdey Supplemental Statement 07/06/1999, see www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s023a.pdf
It is apparent after reading these rebuttal statements that the investigations into the OP connection to BSE have been sloppy at best, eg: the data pertaining to the usage/sales of Phosmet were mysteriously lost, (#45. within testimony of Dr. A. Andrews, BSE Inquiry).
I believe that in order to do a proper technical review of the research and data pertaining to BSE, the ABP Technical committee must look at the facts as presented from their original sourced studies, and not rely upon the conclusions of other committees set up to simplify, modify and achieve some political or economical agenda which does not match own.
Our agenda should only be the truth, and the truth can only be determined by examining the scientific facts ourselves.
My husband and I remain at your disposal should the ABP Technical committee desire our assistance with this matter, which on all accounts, will remain with us permanently, unless we choose to take charge of the information and resolve it to our satisfaction.
Yours Truly,
Mrs. Kathy Czar
Marvin Conrad, Chairman
Technical Committee
320, 6715 – 8th Street NE
Calgary, Alberta
T2H 7H7
RE: AARI Report “Needs and Gaps Relevant to BSE” & the “Harvard BSE Risk Analysis”
Dear Mr. Conrad,
With the issuance of the ABP Annual Report 2004, it has come to my attention that false and misleading information is continuing to push its way into analytical reports regarding BSE. The problem starts with the following statement quoted from the AARI report, within your technical committee’s report;
“While other hypothesis on the origin of BSE point to copper deficiency or exposure to organophosphates, the Harvard Centre for Risk Analysis points out that epidemiological data does not support these hypothesis.”
Upon examination of the source of this statement within the Harvard analysis document, no specific epidemiological data can be found, instead there is a reliance solely upon the Gabriel Horne Report 2001 commissioned by the U.K. government. This report stated:
“Nearly all cows which developed BSE were born after 1982 so were never treated with Phosmet to eradicate warble fly.”
This statement is false, and originates from lies tabled within the Horne report regarding the timing of the UK Warble Eradication Program. In fact, the warble eradication program STARTED in 1982. (Warble Fly Order 1982).
Cattle producers in the UK were given the option of using Phosmet or Ivermectin, for control of warbles. In some counties the Order was compulsory, while others were not. The use of Ivermectin required a 28 day withdrawal period (for milk and meat), while the use of Phosmet had a withdrawal period of only 6 hours. This fact, forced dairy farmers to use the Phosmet or lose a months worth of income from their milk sales. The beef producers, mostly, chose to use the Ivermectin.
One of the proponents of the organophosphate (OP) connection is Mark Purdey. I am sure you are aware of his work. Mark took the British Government to court and challenged the 1982 Order by way of a judicial review. This was in 1984. The government had planned on treating his cattle with the OP compound and recovering their expenses from Mark. The judicial review sided in favor of Mr. Purdey; and he was exempted from treating his dairy cows with Phosmet. Restrictions were placed on the movement of his cattle; and, he agreed to treat his heifers with Ivermectin.
ABP Technical Committee/Czar letter… Page 2
This data clearly shows that the Horne report statement, followed by both the Harvard BSE Risk Assessment and the Alberta Agricultural Research Institute “Perspective” are false and inaccurate. When the British Government was told that they would be sued for the misleading and false information published in the Horne Report (a lawsuit threatened by Mr. Purdey), Mr. Purdey was told that he could not sue anyone who was acting on behalf of the Government. The Horne report remained as it was, and no attempt has been made to correct these lies.
In an attempt to then crush the OP connection, Harvard restates that OPs had been in use since 1960 and that the epidemiology did not suggest any connection, as, “nearly all cows which developed BSE were born after 1982…”. This statement is a half truth. The committees in Britain, USA, and Canada have failed to address; (1) the substantially lower chemical concentrations of Phosmet used in the years preceding 1982, (2) whether the product was used as a systemic (oil-based), or surface contact (water-based), (3) increased frequency of application (bi-annual), (4) government campaign recommending 14-day follow-up reapplication after 1982, etc. etc. etc.
Papers released from the BSE Inquiry show that the toxic chemical concentration of Phosmet in the ‘60s and ‘70s was 5% (1972). In December of 1978, a concentration of 20% was first approved. All of these reports, quoted by your committee, fail to acknowledge existing epidemiological data correlating high BSE prevalence in countries specifically using this high concentration in their own warble eradication programs.
Another statement, within the Horne report, made to crush the OP connection was:
“Guernsey, which had no official campaign against warble fly had 669 cases of BSE. Jersey which did officially treat cattle for warbles had only 138 cases”.
The Horne committee did not take into account that cattle producers, although not ordered to use the product, not only did so at their own choosing, but, were strongly encouraged to use the product through government promotional campaigns. Therefore, in actuality, the fact that an official government mandated program existed, or did not exist, has no relationship as to actual chemical usage. To date, the UK Government and chemical manufacturing companies refuse to provide historical chemical distribution data to validate their claims.
Further, based on OIE data, the number of cases reported in Guernsey, as of June 30/04, is 700, of these only 100 were actually tested for BSE. The remaining 600 were diagnosed on clinical grounds only. Considering that the clinical symptoms of BSE, OP poisoning and other neurological diseases are similar in cattle, hundreds of the suspect Guernsey animals may not have had BSE at all. Only if the animals on both islands had been tested in an identical manner for BSE, could we compare them epidemiologically. Any existing comparison of these statistics is unscientific and misleading.
ABP Technical Committee/Czar letter… Page 3
There are many other factors which can explain this scenario; however, the investigating committees have refused to follow them up. An acquaintance of ours, formerly from the UK, has stated “that the health of their dairy herd required copper sulfate be added on a daily basis to its’ drinking water, or else the cattle started to stagger and hump-up”. There was no investigation to determine who may have been treating their cattle in this, or any other manner, which might have prevented these clinical symptoms.
At this time, I would strongly suggest that you read a document submitted by Mark Purdey to the British Government outlining his rebuttal of statements made in the Gabriel Horne report, entitled, “The Prof. Gabriel Horne report on the origins of BSE and the research of Mark
Purdey.” This can be found at www.purdeyenvironment.com/Horne.htm There are many other false and misleading statements from the Horne report which Mr. Purdey addresses.
Upon further inquiry, I have also found many important documents from Mr. Purdey that warrant your time and full attention. These are:
BSE Inquiry/Statement No. 23 Evidence given on 02/04/98 – statement by Mark Purdey ,
See www.purdeyenvironment.com/bseinqui.htm
Also of great value is his rebuttal statements made to correct misinformation from others who testified at the BSE Inquiry. This is called Mark Purdey Supplemental Statement 07/06/1999, see www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s023a.pdf
It is apparent after reading these rebuttal statements that the investigations into the OP connection to BSE have been sloppy at best, eg: the data pertaining to the usage/sales of Phosmet were mysteriously lost, (#45. within testimony of Dr. A. Andrews, BSE Inquiry).
I believe that in order to do a proper technical review of the research and data pertaining to BSE, the ABP Technical committee must look at the facts as presented from their original sourced studies, and not rely upon the conclusions of other committees set up to simplify, modify and achieve some political or economical agenda which does not match own.
Our agenda should only be the truth, and the truth can only be determined by examining the scientific facts ourselves.
My husband and I remain at your disposal should the ABP Technical committee desire our assistance with this matter, which on all accounts, will remain with us permanently, unless we choose to take charge of the information and resolve it to our satisfaction.
Yours Truly,
Mrs. Kathy Czar
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