What are these Liberals afraid of?
Raymond J. De Souza - Monday,27 February 2006
Western Standard
At his final news conference as prime minister, Paul Martin emphasized Canada's strong economic performance, one of the best in the G-8. But he knew that the economy wasn't the issue in the last election. Stephen Harper fought it in large part on corruption, and Martin tried to fight it on social issues. It was a values and culture election, perhaps signalling something of a cultural realignment in Canadian politics. Wonder why so many star Liberal candidates--Allan Rock, Brian Tobin, John Manley and Frank McKenna--have declined to take a run for the party leadership? It could be because they sense a permanent shift in the Canadian political landscape for which the Liberal party, in its current form, just isn't prepared.
In the immediate aftermath of the election, it was stressed far and wide that the Conservative victory was fragile, in part because there were no seats in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, our three largest cities. They were limited to the hinterland, it was argued; destined to return to the Opposition benches unless they embraced the cultural issues (gay marriage primary among them) that were preventing gains in the cities. "No political party is ever going to form a majority government in this country without substantial support from Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver," wrote John Ibbitson in the Jan. 26 Globe and Mail. "If they're ever going to win a majority, the Tories still need to convince urbanites that social conservatism is not high on their agenda," opined Adam Radwanski in the Jan. 27 National Post.
Actually, the Conservatives did well in urban Canada. They won a majority of seats in the fourth (Ottawa) and seventh (Quebec City) largest cities, and swept the fifth (Calgary) and sixth (Edmonton). They won seats in the suburbs of Toronto and Vancouver, which, while not downtown ridings, are certainly not rural.
Indeed, the dominance of the Liberals in the three biggest cities was their weakness. More than half of total Liberal seats came from these three cities; of 103 seats, 35 came from the Greater Toronto Area, 13 from Montreal and six from Vancouver. Excluding the 20 Grit seats in Atlantic Canada, they won only 29 seats in all of the rest of Canada, leaving vast swaths of the country in which the nearest Liberal MP is not within several hours' drive. Support for the Liberals begins to drop as we get to the edge of the three big cities. In the Hamilton/ Burlington/Niagara region, the Liberals won 7 out of 10 seats in 2004. This time, just one. For the Liberals to get back to majority government territory, they must find more than 50 seats in areas where their seat totals have been steadily declining (since they have already maxed out their seat totals in the three cities).
A Conservative majority, meanwhile, requires just 30 more seats. How close is that? Consider a 50-25-15 formula. If the Conservatives could win 50 seats in Ontario (10 more than at present), 25 in Quebec (15 more) and 15 in Atlantic Canada (6 more), they would form a majority, if their western Canadian support holds.
The critical fact: 50-25-15 would still leave them with a minority of seats in Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada. It's a modest increase and it could be accomplished by winning no seats at all in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.
Such an approach could be perceived by some as lacking national vision--a desire to win power without winning seats in all parts of the country. It's a fair point, except that the post-Diefenbaker Liberal majorities have been exactly these narrow majorities. Jean Chrétien's three majorities were each won with more than half of the seats coming from one province, Ontario. Pierre Trudeau did the same in 1980, taking 74 seats in Quebec, and 73 seats elsewhere for a slim majority of 147. In his 1974 majority, Trudeau took 141 total seats (60 in Quebec, 55 in Ontario). And even in the Trudeaumania election of 1968, he took 120 of his 155 seats in Ontario and Quebec.
Save for the Diefenbaker and Mulroney sweeps, it is the exception that a majority government holds significant numbers of seats in all parts of the country. In fact, by recent historical standards, the Harper minority has exceptionally well-balanced representation across the country, and Harper is less dependent on western seats than Chrétien was upon Ontario, or Trudeau upon Quebec.
The successful Liberal model has been rather simple: dominate one large part of the country, and then add bits and pieces from elsewhere to reach just beyond majority status.
With the four western provinces now accounting for 92 seats, and the Conservatives taking 65 of them, that strategy is now available for Stephen Harper. Indeed, the question is whether he will try to grow to a majority by doing something rarely done in recent Canadian politics--namely, to win a majority in two or more regions of the country, including seats in the three biggest cities--or whether he will imitate Trudeau and Chrétien by dominating his base and adding just enough elsewhere to get to majority status.
One expects that Harper might opt for the "narrow majority" option, as it can be rather more focused than the unwieldy sweeps of Diefenbaker and Mulroney. Harper, remember, left his job with the Mulroney government precisely because he rejected the compromises inherent in such a large majority.
While the Conservatives would no doubt like to win seats wherever they can be had, the trend over the past five elections has shown a very deliberate process of targeted growth (unwittingly or not). In the 1993 election, the Reform and Progressive Conservative parties took 54 seats, all but two in the West. In 1997, the combined total was 80 seats, as the western base was expanded, and the traditional Tory seats in Atlantic Canada returned, along with five seats in Quebec. In 2000, the total held steady at 78 seats, largely from the same areas. By the time of the 2003 merger, the Reform/Alliance/PC amalgam had secured its domination of the West and maintained a minority presence in the traditional Tory ridings in Atlantic Canada. In the first post-merger election in 2004, to that base were added rural seats in eastern and southwestern Ontario. In 2006, the Conservatives took most of the seats outside the GTA and northern Ontario, as well as adding the old bleu ridings around Quebec City.
A steady progression is discernible from 1993 to 2006. What has often been called the "lost decade" for conservative politics, 1993-2003, was actually a time of steady, if slow, growth in building the foundations of a new conservative coalition. And given that generally the Liberals have ruled for about 20 years in between periods of Tory usurpation, to eject them from office after only 12 years is noteworthy.
First was the rock-solid small-c conservative west in B.C. and Alberta. Then came the rest of the West, and the traditional Tories of Atlantic Canada. To that was added the more "western" parts of Ontario--the rural east and southwest, and a few seats in the exurbs of Toronto. Finally, the traditionally bleu seats of Quebec. The coalition is quite recognizable--the small-c and more traditional conservative ridings across the country. Should the Conservatives manage next time around to achieve 50-25-15 by picking up a few conservative suburban seats in Ontario, reaching more of the bleu regions in Quebec where the old Créditiste and Union Nationale parties did well, and enticing back another half-dozen traditional Tory Atlantic ridings, the long road back from 1993 will be complete.
And it will likely be a cultural coalition. The Conservative platform of choice in child care and tax credits for hockey and dance lessons appeal to married people with children, many of whom have left the downtown core for a better environment to raise their kids. The coalition of rural areas with conservative social values (as true in Saskatchewan as it is in Quebec), suburban parents concerned about the effects of a coarse culture upon their children, and traditional Tories who wish to preserve an enduring way of life--this is a coalition not united by economic interests, but by cultural ones. We may be accustomed to seeing the electoral maps of Canada coloured by region. But we could soon see maps coloured by culture instead.
Raymond J. De Souza - Monday,27 February 2006
Western Standard
At his final news conference as prime minister, Paul Martin emphasized Canada's strong economic performance, one of the best in the G-8. But he knew that the economy wasn't the issue in the last election. Stephen Harper fought it in large part on corruption, and Martin tried to fight it on social issues. It was a values and culture election, perhaps signalling something of a cultural realignment in Canadian politics. Wonder why so many star Liberal candidates--Allan Rock, Brian Tobin, John Manley and Frank McKenna--have declined to take a run for the party leadership? It could be because they sense a permanent shift in the Canadian political landscape for which the Liberal party, in its current form, just isn't prepared.
In the immediate aftermath of the election, it was stressed far and wide that the Conservative victory was fragile, in part because there were no seats in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, our three largest cities. They were limited to the hinterland, it was argued; destined to return to the Opposition benches unless they embraced the cultural issues (gay marriage primary among them) that were preventing gains in the cities. "No political party is ever going to form a majority government in this country without substantial support from Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver," wrote John Ibbitson in the Jan. 26 Globe and Mail. "If they're ever going to win a majority, the Tories still need to convince urbanites that social conservatism is not high on their agenda," opined Adam Radwanski in the Jan. 27 National Post.
Actually, the Conservatives did well in urban Canada. They won a majority of seats in the fourth (Ottawa) and seventh (Quebec City) largest cities, and swept the fifth (Calgary) and sixth (Edmonton). They won seats in the suburbs of Toronto and Vancouver, which, while not downtown ridings, are certainly not rural.
Indeed, the dominance of the Liberals in the three biggest cities was their weakness. More than half of total Liberal seats came from these three cities; of 103 seats, 35 came from the Greater Toronto Area, 13 from Montreal and six from Vancouver. Excluding the 20 Grit seats in Atlantic Canada, they won only 29 seats in all of the rest of Canada, leaving vast swaths of the country in which the nearest Liberal MP is not within several hours' drive. Support for the Liberals begins to drop as we get to the edge of the three big cities. In the Hamilton/ Burlington/Niagara region, the Liberals won 7 out of 10 seats in 2004. This time, just one. For the Liberals to get back to majority government territory, they must find more than 50 seats in areas where their seat totals have been steadily declining (since they have already maxed out their seat totals in the three cities).
A Conservative majority, meanwhile, requires just 30 more seats. How close is that? Consider a 50-25-15 formula. If the Conservatives could win 50 seats in Ontario (10 more than at present), 25 in Quebec (15 more) and 15 in Atlantic Canada (6 more), they would form a majority, if their western Canadian support holds.
The critical fact: 50-25-15 would still leave them with a minority of seats in Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada. It's a modest increase and it could be accomplished by winning no seats at all in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.
Such an approach could be perceived by some as lacking national vision--a desire to win power without winning seats in all parts of the country. It's a fair point, except that the post-Diefenbaker Liberal majorities have been exactly these narrow majorities. Jean Chrétien's three majorities were each won with more than half of the seats coming from one province, Ontario. Pierre Trudeau did the same in 1980, taking 74 seats in Quebec, and 73 seats elsewhere for a slim majority of 147. In his 1974 majority, Trudeau took 141 total seats (60 in Quebec, 55 in Ontario). And even in the Trudeaumania election of 1968, he took 120 of his 155 seats in Ontario and Quebec.
Save for the Diefenbaker and Mulroney sweeps, it is the exception that a majority government holds significant numbers of seats in all parts of the country. In fact, by recent historical standards, the Harper minority has exceptionally well-balanced representation across the country, and Harper is less dependent on western seats than Chrétien was upon Ontario, or Trudeau upon Quebec.
The successful Liberal model has been rather simple: dominate one large part of the country, and then add bits and pieces from elsewhere to reach just beyond majority status.
With the four western provinces now accounting for 92 seats, and the Conservatives taking 65 of them, that strategy is now available for Stephen Harper. Indeed, the question is whether he will try to grow to a majority by doing something rarely done in recent Canadian politics--namely, to win a majority in two or more regions of the country, including seats in the three biggest cities--or whether he will imitate Trudeau and Chrétien by dominating his base and adding just enough elsewhere to get to majority status.
One expects that Harper might opt for the "narrow majority" option, as it can be rather more focused than the unwieldy sweeps of Diefenbaker and Mulroney. Harper, remember, left his job with the Mulroney government precisely because he rejected the compromises inherent in such a large majority.
While the Conservatives would no doubt like to win seats wherever they can be had, the trend over the past five elections has shown a very deliberate process of targeted growth (unwittingly or not). In the 1993 election, the Reform and Progressive Conservative parties took 54 seats, all but two in the West. In 1997, the combined total was 80 seats, as the western base was expanded, and the traditional Tory seats in Atlantic Canada returned, along with five seats in Quebec. In 2000, the total held steady at 78 seats, largely from the same areas. By the time of the 2003 merger, the Reform/Alliance/PC amalgam had secured its domination of the West and maintained a minority presence in the traditional Tory ridings in Atlantic Canada. In the first post-merger election in 2004, to that base were added rural seats in eastern and southwestern Ontario. In 2006, the Conservatives took most of the seats outside the GTA and northern Ontario, as well as adding the old bleu ridings around Quebec City.
A steady progression is discernible from 1993 to 2006. What has often been called the "lost decade" for conservative politics, 1993-2003, was actually a time of steady, if slow, growth in building the foundations of a new conservative coalition. And given that generally the Liberals have ruled for about 20 years in between periods of Tory usurpation, to eject them from office after only 12 years is noteworthy.
First was the rock-solid small-c conservative west in B.C. and Alberta. Then came the rest of the West, and the traditional Tories of Atlantic Canada. To that was added the more "western" parts of Ontario--the rural east and southwest, and a few seats in the exurbs of Toronto. Finally, the traditionally bleu seats of Quebec. The coalition is quite recognizable--the small-c and more traditional conservative ridings across the country. Should the Conservatives manage next time around to achieve 50-25-15 by picking up a few conservative suburban seats in Ontario, reaching more of the bleu regions in Quebec where the old Créditiste and Union Nationale parties did well, and enticing back another half-dozen traditional Tory Atlantic ridings, the long road back from 1993 will be complete.
And it will likely be a cultural coalition. The Conservative platform of choice in child care and tax credits for hockey and dance lessons appeal to married people with children, many of whom have left the downtown core for a better environment to raise their kids. The coalition of rural areas with conservative social values (as true in Saskatchewan as it is in Quebec), suburban parents concerned about the effects of a coarse culture upon their children, and traditional Tories who wish to preserve an enduring way of life--this is a coalition not united by economic interests, but by cultural ones. We may be accustomed to seeing the electoral maps of Canada coloured by region. But we could soon see maps coloured by culture instead.